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Tracy: Kellogg Company v. Exxon Corporation 209 F.3d 562 (6th Cir. 2000)

CASE SUMMARIES
Kellogg Company v. Exxon Corporation
209 F.3d 562 (6 th Cir. 2000)
INTRODUCTION
Kellogg Company, ("Kellogg") filed a claim against Exxon in
the United District Court for the Western District of Tennessee
seeking actual and punitive damages for Exxon's use of its cartoon
tiger trademark in connection with the sale of food items.1
Kellogg also sought a preliminary and a permanent injunction to
prohibit Exxon from continued use of its cartoon tiger in
connection with the sale of food items on the grounds that it (1)
unlawfully infringed upon Kellogg's "Tony the Tiger" mark and
(2) diluted Kellogg's "Tony the Tiger" mark.2 Kellogg further
sought declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 2202,
requesting that Exxon be forced to abandon with prejudice its
application for federal trademark registration of its "Hungry Tiger
and Design" mark.3 Exxon filed a counterclaim pursuant to 15
U.S.C. § 1119 seeking its right to federally register its marks.
Exxon used in support of this counterclaim the argument that it
intended to use its mark to promote retail convenience store
services rendered at gasoline stations.
Exxon moved for summary judgment on the infringement claim
relying on an affirmative defense of acquiescence. 5 Acquiescence
is the giving of implied consent to a transaction, an accrual of a
1 Kellogg Company v. Exxon Corp., 209 F.3d 562 (6th Cir. 2000).

2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 567.
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right, or to any act by mere silence or without express assent or
Exxon also moved for partial summary
acknowledgment.
judgment on Kellogg's claims of abandonment and progressive
encroachment. 6 The District Court granted Exxon's motions for
summary judgment and partial summary judgment and dismissed
Kellogg's bad faith infringement and dilution claims.7 The
District Court did not rule on Exxon's counterclaim. Kellogg
appealed this decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's order granting summary
judgment to Exxon on Kellogg's claims of infringement, dilution
and abandonment, vacated the district court's grant of summary
judgment to Exxon on Kellogg's claims of progressive
the case for further consideration
encroachment, and remanded
8
consistent with its opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
Kellogg owns several federal trademark registrations for the
name and appearance of its "Tony the Tiger" trademark. 9
Kellogg's trademark registrations cover, among other things,
"cereal derived food product to be used as a breakfast food, snack
food, or ingredient for making food."' 0 Kellogg began using a
cartoon tiger in connection with "Kellogg's Frosted Flakes" cereal
and registered its mark with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office in 1952.11
In 1959, Exxon began using a cartoon tiger to promote its motor
fuel products. In 1965, Exxon federally registered its "Whimsical12
Tiger" for use in connection with the sale of petroleum products.
It was not opposed by Kellogg and became incontestable in
1970.13 Exxon ran an advertisement campaign from 1964 to 1968
6 Kellogg, 209 F.3d at 576.
7 Id.
8 Id.at 562.
9 Id. at 564.
10 Id.
11 Kellogg, 209 F.3d at 564.
12 Id.

13 Id.at 565.
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during which time it used its cartoon tiger to further the theme,
"Put a Tiger in Your Tank." 14 At the end of the advertising
campaign in 1968, Kellogg requested Exxon not to oppose its
registration of "Tony the Tiger" in Germany5 and in doing so
acknowledged Exxon's use of its cartoon tiger.'
In the early 1980s Exxon's advertising agency suggested that
Exxon phase out the use of its cartoon tiger and begin using a live
tiger. 16 A year later, in 1981, Exxon began to modernize its gas
pumps and to eliminate its cartoon tiger on the pump panels. One
concern that Exxon had was to be able to reduce its use of the
17
cartoon tiger while still ensuring protection of its trademark.
Numerous Exxon stations were slow to remove the cartoon tiger
from their pumps.' 8 By 1987 10% of the 11,000 distribution
stations still exhibited the cartoon tiger. In order to remedy this
problem, Exxon actually forced its distributors to comply with the
removal of the cartoon tiger by threatening to remove from the
Exxon chain those stations that had not complied by April 1,
1995.1'
Throughout this process and in an effort to maintain its rights to
the mark, Exxon renewed its federal trademark registration for the
cartoon tiger.20 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Exxon's use of
the cartoon tiger took on various forms. For example, a costumed
version of the cartoon tiger was used for some grand opening
events; in 1989, Exxon ran a "Color to Win" promotion in which
over one million contestants submitted entries of a cartoon tiger;
and, in the early 1990s, Exxon used the cartoon tiger to promote
the Texas State Fair. Shortly after the Exxon Valdez oil spill,
Exxon changed the general appearance of its cartoon tiger. The
object was to make it a more endearing and friendly tiger. 2 1 Exxon
had opened its first company-operated convenience store in 1984
14 Id. at 564.
15 Id. at 565.
16 Kellogg, 209 F.3d at. at 565.
17 Id at 566.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Kellogg, 209 F.3d at 565.
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but it was not until 1990 that it used its cartoon tiger to promote
non-petroleum products such as Coca-Cola, Pepsi, Lays Potato
Chips, and Dunkin Donuts.22 Such use of the cartoon tiger only
increased from 1992 to 1996.
By October of 1996 there were over
23
stores.
Mart"
"Tiger
265
Kellogg learned of Exxon's use of the cartoon tiger in the
United States and immediately requested examples of such use
from an Exxon attorney. Kellogg was promptly sent fourteen
examples of Exxon's promotional materials displaying the cartoon
tiger.24 None of these examples, however, displayed Exxon's use
of its cartoon tiger in conjunction with the promotion of food and
beverage items, nor did any of the examples
sent by Exxon
25
disclose Exxon's new "Tiger Mart" stores.
In March 1996 Exxon published for opposition its application to
register its cartoon tiger for use with convenience stores. In
response, Kellogg commenced opposition proceedings. 26 On
October 7, 1996, Kellogg filed suit against Exxon in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee.27
Kellogg sought: (1) actual and punitive damages; and, (2)
preliminary and permanent injunctions to prohibit Exxon's
continued use of its cartoon tiger in connection with the sale of
food items on the grounds that it "unlawfully infringed upon and
diluted Kellogg's "Tony the Tiger" mark.28 In response, Exxon
moved for summary judgment based on an affirmative defense of
acquiescence. 29 Exxon also moved for partial summary judgment
on Kellogg's claims of abandonment and progressive
encroachment. 30 The District Court granted these motions and
31
dismissed Kellogg's bad faith infringement and dilution claims.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.

25 Id.
26 Kellogg, 209 F.3d at 567.

27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Kellogg, 209 F.3d at 567.
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II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. ISSUES
On appeal, the issues the Sixth Circuit considered regarding the
alleged trademark infringement were (1) whether the district court
improperly granted summary judgment because Exxon presented
no evidence that Kellogg acquiesced in Exxon's use of its cartoon
tiger in connection with the sale on non-petroleum products; (2)
whether the district court improperly denied Kellogg's progressive
encroachment claim because progressive encroachment is not
limited by a requirement of "direct competition" and the district
court failed to consider the likelihood of confusion between the
two marks; (3) whether the district court improperly denied
Kellogg's abandonment claim because there are genuine issues of
material fact with regard to whether Exxon's use of its cartoon
tiger during the 1980s was bona fide or a sham to protect its rights
in the mark; and (4) whether the district court improperly
dismissed Kellogg's bad faith infringement and dilution claims as
moot. 32 On appeal, Kellogg abandoned its33claim for damages and
pursued only its claim for injunctive relief.
B. DISCUSSION
The Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court's grant of summary
34
judgment de novo based on the ruling in Avery v. King.
Summary judgment is appropriate when there exists no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.35 The court reviewed the motion for summary

32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. citing Avery v. King, 110 F.3d 12, 13 (6th Cir. 1997).
35 Id.
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judgment and36the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
1. Laches, Acquiescence, andAbandonment
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Exxon asserted
the affirmative defenses of laches and acquiescence. The doctrines
of laches and acquiescence assume some underlying infringement,
and the court therefore recognized the doctrine of progressive
encroachment as giving Kellogg some latitude in its timing of
bringing suit to wait until "the likelihood of confusion looms
large.", 37 The first issue addressed by the Sixth Circuit was the
district court's holding that Kellogg assented to Exxon's use of the
cartoon tiger. In granting Exxon's motion for summary judgment
based on acquiescence, the district court reasoned that because
Kellogg remained silent for an extended period of time and did not
"facilitate the protection of its trademark," Kellogg had engaged in
actions that constituted "conduct amounting to virtual
abandonment such that it acquiesced in Exxon's infringing use of
its cartoon tiger." 38 In coming to this conclusion, the district court
relied on the Anheuser-Bush decision, which stated "Mere delay
by the injured party in bringing suit would not bar injunctive relief;
but this doctrine has its limits. For example, had there been a lapse
of a hundred years or more, we think it highly dubious that any
court of equity would
grant injunctive relief against even a
39
infringer.,
fraudulent
The Sixth Circuit held that the district court erred in its
conclusion regarding Kellogg's acquiescence of its trademark.4 °
The Court reasoned that Kellogg's failure to oppose Exxon's
registration of its tiger and the lapse of time from their registration

36 Kellogg, 209 F.3d at 568, citing Wathen v. General Electric Co., 115 F.3d
400, 403 (6th Cir. 1997).
37 Kellogg, 209 F.3d at 571.
38 Id. at 572.
39 Kellogg, 209 F.3d at 568, citing Anheuser-Bush v. DuBois Brewing Co.,
175 F.2d 370, 374 (3rd Cir. 1949).
40 Kellogg, 209 F.3d at 573.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/14
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to this action was not dispositive.4 1 Although Exxon did register
its "Whimsical Tiger" trademark in 1965 without opposition from
Kellogg, Exxon's trademark was to promote the sale of petroleum
products while Kellogg's use of its trademark was in connection
with food products and sales.4 2 Consequently, the two marks coexisted in different markets. The Court of Appeals further
reasoned that since proof of likelihood of confusion is essential to
any trademark infringement claim, Kellogg was not obligated to
bring suit at that time because the two marks were operating in
different markets, and consequently,43 the likelihood of confusion
between the two marks was minimal.
At some point after 1965, however, Exxon moved its use of its
"Whimsical Tiger" into the non-petroleum market of food and
beverages. It was at this time that Kellogg knew or should have
known that it had a claim for trademark infringement and had a
duty to protect its mark. The Court of Appeals deduced that it was
from this point in time, not when Exxon first registered its
trademark, that any delay must be measured for determining laches
or acquiescence. 44 Using this reasoning, the Court of Appeals
asserted that Exxon's 1965 registration of its "Whimsical Tiger"
was "insufficient to put Kellogg on notice of Exxon's later use of
its cartoon tiger in connection with the sale of non-petroleum
products." 45 The court then stated that the district court's failure to
distinguish between the sale of petroleum and non-petroleum
products, and therefore the different markets targeted by the two
companies, resulted in "the clearly erroneous conclusion that
Kellogg acquiesced in Exxon's use of its cartoon tiger to promote
any and all of its products.46 The Court of Appeals further noted
that the record reflects a factual dispute as to when Kellogg was
put on notice of Exxon's use of its cartoon tiger in the mid 1980s
or in the early 1990s.

41 Id.

42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 574.
45 Kellogg, 209 F.3d at 574.
46 Id.
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One argument was that in 1992, when Kellogg requested
samples of current use of its cartoon tiger, Exxon did not include
any examples of the use of the cartoon tiger in conjunction with
the sale of non-petroleum items, and therefore Kellogg was lead to
believe that Exxon's use of the tiger was still limited to the sale
and promotion of petroleum products. 47 The Court of Appeals,
however, reasoned that even if they assumed that Kellogg knew or
should have known in 1984 about Exxon's use, Kellogg's
subsequent failure to bring suit until 1996 was not "so outrageous,
unreasonable, and inexcusable as to constitute virtual
abandonment of its right" to seek injunctive relief with regard to
the sale of non-petroleum products. 48 In conclusion, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that as a
matter of law, Kellogg did not acquiesce in Exxon's use of its
cartoon tiger in connection with the sale of non-petroleum
products. 49 For this reason, the Court of Appeals reversed the
district court's grant of summary judgment on the infringement
50
claim and remanded this case for trial on the merits of that claim.
2. ProgressiveEncroachment
Next, the Court of Appeals addressed the district court's
conclusion that "direct competition" was dispositive of Kellogg's
progressive encroachment claim. The district court stated that the
connection between Exxon's products and Kellogg's products was
too attenuated to support Kellogg's claim of progressive
encroachment. 51 The Court of Appeals held that the district court
erred in this conclusion because its analysis focused only on
whether there was direct competition between identical products
and not whether there was a likelihood of confusion between the
two products. 52
This court reasoned that progressive
47 Id.
48 Kellogg, 209 F.3d at 574, citing University of Pittsburgh v. Champion
Prod. Inc., 686 F.2d at 1044-45.
49 Kellogg, 209 F.3d at 574.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 575.
52 Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/14
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encroachment had relevance only to counter Exxon's claim of
acquiescence in order to explain Kellogg's delay in filing suit.
Since this court already found that Kellogg did not acquiesce in
Exxon's use of the cartoon tiger, the Court of Appeals vacated the
district court's grant of summary -judgment with regard to
progressive encroachment.53
3. Abandonment
Kellogg further claimed that Exxon had abandoned the cartoon
tiger mark.54 In order to succeed on a claim of abandonment it
must prove both non-use and intent, i.e. the party claiming
abandonment must show that the other party abandoned its mark
through non-use and that it intended to do so.55 Kellogg argued
that Exxon abandoned its "bona fide" use of the cartoon tiger
during the 1970s and 1980s, and that consequently, "Exxon may
not rely on its use of the cartoon tiger prior to 1991 to support its
affirmative defenses to Kellogg's infringement claims."5 6 Kellogg
also argued that Exxon's use of its cartoon tiger during the 1980s
was not "bona fide" but was rather done to reserve a right in the
mark.57 The court reasoned there were still genuine issues of
material fact with regard to whether Exxon's use of its cartoon
tiger during the 1980s was bona fide, or simply a sham to protect
its rights in the mark. 58 The Court of Appeals again reversed the
district court's grant of summary judgment on this issue because
this abandonment claim "may be germane to issues remaining for
trial" on remand. 59 Additionally, because the Court of Appeals
53 Id.
54 Kellogg, 209 F.3d at 575.
55 Id. citing United States Jaycees v. Philadelphia Jaycees, 639 F.2d 134, 138
(3rd Cir. 1981) (interpreting the definition of abandonment provided in Section
1127 of the Lanham Act).
56 Kellogg, 209 F.3d at 576.
57 Id. citing Exxon Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co., Inc., 695 F.2d 96, 99100 (5th Cir. 1983) (recognizing that use of a trademark solely for the purposes
of maintaining trademark rights does not qualify as "bona fide" use under
Section 1127 of the Lanham Act).
58 Kellogg, 209 F.3d at 576.
59 Id.
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held as a matter of law that Kellogg did not acquiesce in Exxon's
use of the cartoon tiger, Kellogg's abandonment
claim with regard
60
to Exxon's affirmative defense is moot.
4. Dilution
The Lanham Act, as amended by the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995 defines dilution as "the lessening of the
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods and
services regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition
between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) the
likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception. 6 1 In light of this
definition and the district court's improper reliance on the
attenuation between Kellogg's product and Exxon's product in its
dismissal of Kellogg's dilution claim, this court held that the
district court's
dismissal of Kellogg's dilution claim was
62
improper.
CONCLUSION
The court of appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the judgment
of the district court granting summary judgment to Exxon on
Kellogg's claims of infringement, dilution and abandonment. This
appellate court vacated the grant to summary judgment to Exxon
on Kellogg's claim of progressive encroachment, and remanded
the case for further proceedings consistent with their opinion.

Johanna Tracy

60 Id.
61 Id. citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
62 Kellogg, 209 F.3d at 577.
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